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FAILED EXACTIONS
Mark Fenster*†
INTRODUCTION
This Article considers the doctrinal quandary created by “failed
exactions”—regulatory conditions on property development that
government agencies contemplate but that are never finalized or enforced.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission1 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,2
the Supreme Court provided a quantitative and qualitative framework for
judicial review under the Takings Clause of conditions that government
agencies attach to approvals of a property owner’s application to intensify
land use.3 Reaffirmed most recently in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,4
Nollan and Dolan both blessed and limited these so-called land use
“exactions.” The Court established two standards for lower courts to apply
when deciding whether an individual condition takes private property
without just compensation. Under Nollan and Dolan, agencies must
demonstrate that a condition bears an “essential nexus”5 and has a “rough
proportionality”6 to the impact the condition intends to address.
Considerably more rigorous than the deferential review established in Penn
Central7 for takings challenges to most regulatory acts, Nollan and Dolan’s
intermediate scrutiny is considerably less rigorous than the strict scrutiny
that courts apply to certain limited categories of regulatory acts.
The most significant legal question that failed exactions raise is
whether Nollan and Dolan’s intermediate scrutiny applies to them. Given
exactions’ prevalence in land use regulation,8 the issue’s resolution could

* Samuel T. Dell Research Scholar, Levin College of Law, University of Florida. The author
collaborated on an amicus brief representing the Florida Leagues of Cities and Counties before the Florida
Supreme Court in a case discussed extensively below; this Article, however, represents only my views.
† Thanks to John Echeverria and Tim Mulvaney for comments, and to Tara DiJohn and
Stephen Bagge for research assistance.
1. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
2. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
3. Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Context
of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 741–43 (2007) [hereinafter Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a
Constitutional Shadow].
4. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
5. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835.
6. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
7. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
8. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 9.9, at 345 (2d ed. 2007) (“An ever increasing number of local
governments—even those without full scale growth management programs—have adopted policies and
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have significant effects on court dockets and regulatory practice.
Unfortunately, current law provides no clear path to resolution because
Nollan and Dolan do not present a clear, comprehensive definition of an
exaction. Two central questions have repeatedly divided courts and
commentators about Nollan and Dolan’s reach: first, whether a monetary
condition (typically referred to as an “impact fee”) is an exaction subject to
Nollan and Dolan; and second, whether a broadly applicable, legislated
condition (as opposed to an individualized one) receives intermediate
scrutiny.9 The failed exaction issue has received much less attention.10 This
is likely because in the vast majority of cases—including Nollan and
Dolan 11—the regulatory agency whose conditional approval faces
intermediate scrutiny has completed its administrative process and attached
an identifiable condition to an approved permit or other entitlement. This
condition serves as the basis for local and state administrative review,12
judicial review under Nollan and Dolan,13 as well as the determination of a
compensation remedy under the Takings Clause.14
A decade ago, the issue of whether Nollan and Dolan applied to failed
exactions reached the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari from the
denial of which Justice Scalia dissented. Joined by Justices Kennedy and
Thomas, Scalia somewhat tentatively stated that an extortionate demand
could, and perhaps should, trigger review under Nollan and Dolan, even if
the demand is not made part of an agency’s final approval of a regulatory
entitlement.15 At the same time, he also conceded that it is “far from clear”
whether conditions that are never attached to a permit can effect a taking of
property under Nollan and Dolan.16 Both before and after Justice Scalia’s
ruminations, courts have struggled with this question. As the recent Florida
Supreme Court decision in St. Johns Water Management District v. Koontz
programs designed to make new development and not existing residents bear the cost of new capital
improvements . . . necessitated by the new development.”).
9. See generally Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow, supra note 3, at
744–45 (summarizing issues); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 277, 287–89 (2011) (providing comprehensive literature and case law review).
10. I previously identified this unresolved issue in Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory
Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 639–42 (2004) [hereinafter
Fenster, Takings Formalism]. An excellent recent discussion of the issue is Mulvaney, supra note 9.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part IV.D.
13. See infra Part IV.A.
14. See infra Part IV.B.
15. Lambert v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 1045, 1047 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
16. Lambert v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (Cal. App. 1997), review
granted, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 215 (Cal. 1998), appeal dismissed, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412 (Cal. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. at 1047 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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reveals, judicial effort to put the unruly peg of an unenforced condition into
the narrowly defined hole that Nollan and Dolan established creates an
excess of confusion, perhaps beyond even that which Justice Scalia intuited
would accompany such an inquiry.17 In reversing a lower court decision, the
Florida Supreme Court clarified the law yet failed to provide a thorough or
exceptionally clear explanation for its holding.18 Justice Scalia’s challenge
thus still stands at the ready for other courts who might sympathize with
vulnerable landowners being exploited by extortionate government
agencies.
This Article identifies the doctrinal, remedial, procedural, and
consequential dangers of any effort to apply Nollan and Dolan’s
constitutional tests for failed exactions. When viewed in light of Lingle and
the Fifth Amendment, Nollan and Dolan’s tests and remedy only make
sense when a discernible, identified interest in property is in fact taken
following the completion of an administrative process. The simple threat of
possible extortion may warrant federal constitutional remedy and remedies
from other sources of law, but it does not justify a remedy under the
Takings Clause, in which the exclusive remedy is inappropriate and
irrelevant to a failed exaction challenge. To extend Nollan and Dolan
backwards in the regulatory process would stifle the reasonably functional,
albeit imperfect and second-best universe of land use regulations and
processes that have developed in a post-Euclid world.19
Because of the issue’s administrative and factual complexity, I begin in
Part I with a stylized hypothetical example of when and how failed
exactions arise, based loosely on the facts in Koontz. Part II briefly lays out
the legal and administrative context for Nollan and Dolan, including an
account of both decisions and the Court’s restatement of them more
recently in Lingle. Part III summarizes the existing case law on failed
exactions. Finally, Part IV argues why Nollan and Dolan cannot apply to
non-finalized, failed exactions, and identifies other legal means to check
extortionate threats by government agencies.

17. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (Koontz IV), No. SC09-713 (Fla. Nov. 3,
2011), available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2011/sc09-713.pdf.
18. Id. at 3.
19. By characterizing land use regulation as imperfect and second-best, I build on an insight
that Neal Komesar developed more than three decades ago, in which he modeled various institutional
approaches to handling land use externalities disputes and illustrated how two potentially perfect
models—private behavior with a judicial backstop under nuisance law and an omniscient (and
omnipotent) dictator—prove impossible to implement. See Neal K. Komesar, Housing, Zoning, and the
Public Interest, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND I NSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 218, 219–23
(Burton A. Weisbrod et al. eds., 1978).
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I. HOW AND WHEN EXACTIONS FAIL
To understand how exactions fail and what is at stake in the judicial
review of their failure, consider the following hypothetical.
Having noticed increased development in the area surrounding the
property that she owns in the City of Bishop, Audrey wants to improve her
currently undeveloped land to make it viable for commercial use. To do so,
she needs the approval of a panoply of agencies that regulate the effects that
property owners’ development are likely to have on, among other things,
the traffic, schools, floodplains, and animal habitat in the neighboring area
and throughout Bishop. Bishop’s relevant regulatory agencies enjoy the
authority, delegated by state constitution and statute as well as by municipal
charter and ordinance, to deny property owners’ applications and require
owners to mitigate the anticipated effects of their development as a
condition of receiving necessary regulatory approvals. Such conditions
might include fees, the dedication of property or the permanent restriction
of its use, the building and contribution of infrastructure for the public use,
or some combination thereof. These requirements, called “exactions,” may
be calculated with relative precision based on one or more factors, such as:
the proposed footprint; number and size of residential units; type of
commercial development; the current conditions of the property and its
surroundings; and the estimated impact that the use of the development and
the structures themselves may have. However, both the mitigation measures
and their effects are often difficult to calculate, and different measures
might meet the same goals. As a result, agencies can be flexible in what
they are willing to accept in exchange for a regulatory approval.
Let us assume that Audrey has retained some flexibility in her plans
and that she is not entirely settled on precisely how much of her property
she will improve and where on her property she will build. Let us assume,
too, that one agency from which she must receive a permit, the Bishop
Water Management District (BWMD), has concluded that a variety of
mitigation measures would satisfy its concern about the effects Audrey’s
development project might have on the surrounding floodplain and riparian
habitat. In such a situation, it might behoove both Audrey and BWMD to
discuss their individual positions: for Audrey, her willingness and ability to
pay mitigation fees, dedicate land, or limit the size of her development; for
BWMD, its concerns about the project and the regulatory options it is
willing to accept. Such initial discussions might lead to an agreement that
would result in one or more conditions of an acceptable type and quantity
for both parties. Audrey would agree to a certain package of mitigation
measures in exchange for a required approval—a result that might be

2012]

Failed Exactions

627

superior to a flat denial of her permit application.20 The agency might also
prefer this negotiated agreement because it meets the agency’s regulatory
goals while limiting or eliminating the risk and cost of litigation that might
follow a permit denial or a unilaterally imposed condition.
Audrey’s story illustrates a number of characteristics of contemporary
land use regulation. Because each regulated parcel has unique features,
property owners make distinct, individualized development decisions, and
agencies often prefer to enforce their regulations in an individualized
manner. Numerous agencies, operating at different levels (federal, state,
regional, and local) with authority over different aspects of a development,
are typically granted broad regulatory authority over land development.
These agencies seek to exercise their authority with the utmost discretion,
and often do so with the vocal support of existing residents. This is
especially true of the owners of affected neighboring property who are most
likely to engage in the regulatory and local political process that can check
and direct regulatory enforcement. Although she would undoubtedly prefer
to face only an ex post threat of nuisance litigation as a limit to her property
development, Audrey must contend with the existing regulatory and
political environment that prevails in Bishop—one that, in this hypothetical,
provides BWMD with the regulatory authority and political will to impose
exactions on her development.
Nevertheless, she might attempt to challenge the exactions. Imagine
two alternative scenarios in which this might occur. First, suppose that
Audrey is so upset at the very idea of being forced to conduct and pay for
the mitigation that the agency requires—mitigation that the agency
considers in good faith but has not yet formalized—that she rejects the
agency’s reasonable proposal. In response, the agency denies Audrey’s
permit application. Alternatively, suppose that the agency engages in an
unreasonable, extortionate effort that would require Audrey to spend
significantly more money and deed or restrict the use of significantly more
land than is required to mitigate her proposal’s effects. When she refuses,
the agency denies her permit application. In either scenario, Audrey is
likely to file suit.
What is the basis or grounds for her suit—that her permit application
was denied or that she was being forced to accede to a condition to which
she refused to agree? The way that a court poses that question—whether it
reviews the claim as a constitutional challenge to a permit denial or an
exaction—triggers different levels of judicial scrutiny under existing
20. Assume for this example that a denial would leave value in Audrey’s property—a likely
result in most instances anyway—and that the BWMD would not be required to compensate Audrey
under the Penn Central test.
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Supreme Court tests in which the differences are likely to prove outcomedeterminative.
II. EXACTIONS AS A CONSTITUTIONAL CATEGORY
The vast academic literature on regulatory takings narrates, explains,
and critiques the development of these differing standards of review for
regulatory enforcement under the Takings Clause.21 This Part broadly
outlines exactions’ place within the Supreme Court’s scheme and logic. As
the Court comprehensively restated in Lingle, the regulatory takings
doctrine channels analysis into a small set of limited categories of
regulatory effects; the level of judicial scrutiny that courts must apply in an
individual case follows from the category into which the effects fall.22 Two
types of regulatory effects receive strict scrutiny and constitute “per se
takings”23—those regulatory acts that deprive an owner of “all
economically beneficial uses” of a fee interest in real property24 and those
regulatory acts that impose a permanent physical occupation of property.25
In both instances, the Takings Clause requires the state to compensate the
owner for the value of the taken property. If, however, the regulatory effect
falls outside these two “relatively narrow”26 categories, then the Court
usually follows the “principal guidelines”27 and default approach for
resolving regulatory takings claims established in Penn Central.28 The Penn
Central balancing test defers to agencies by having courts balance “the
magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it
interferes with legitimate property interests.”29
This schematic approach, the Supreme Court explained in Lingle,
proceeds from a “common touchstone”:
Each [category and inquiry] aims to identify regulatory actions
that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which
government directly appropriates private property or ousts the
owner from his domain. Accordingly, each of these tests

21. See Mark Fenster, Takings, Version 2005: The Legal Process of Constitutional Property
Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CON. L. 667 (2007) (reviewing some of the vast literature on regulatory takings).
22. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–39, 548 (2005).
23. Id. at 538.
24. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
25. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
26. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
27. Id. at 539.
28. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978).
29. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
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focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that
government imposes upon private property rights.30

A complete diminution of all economically beneficial use places an
absolute burden on an owner who can neither use nor alienate her
property.31 A permanent physical invasion “eviscerates” the right to
exclude, which is “perhaps the most fundamental of all property
interests.”32 Finally, the Penn Central balancing test weighs the extent to
which a regulation is so onerous as to approach confiscation.33 In sum, to
effect a regulatory taking, the impact of a challenged regulation must
approximate the experience of condemnation, where a property owner loses
all rights to and control over her property. The precise nature of how the
regulation approximates confiscation dictates the manner and level of
scrutiny a court will apply.
The exactions decisions constitute a narrow, unique category that
operates, both factually and doctrinally, as a distinct inquiry that lies
between the per se takings categories and the default balancing test.34 By
the 1980s, government agencies involved in urban and suburban planning
regulation had grown increasingly dependent upon such conditions to
supply needed infrastructure.35 The Supreme Court’s development of
federal constitutional limits to these conditions was a reaction to the vast
array of circumstances that developed on the ground in local land use
regulations.36
Land use conditions require a level of constitutional scrutiny distinct
from command-and-control regulation. This is because the government can
impose a land use condition in certain circumstances that, if imposed in
isolation, would amount to a taking.37 Such a taking would require no
compensation if the exaction imposing the condition is qualitatively (via
Nollan’s concern with “nexus”) and quantitatively (via Dolan’s concern

30. Id. at 539.
31. Id. at 539–40.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 546 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379–80 (1994); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987)).
35. See generally Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 10, at 622–26 (summarizing the
development of conditional land use regulation).
36. See generally Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow, supra note 3, at
758–68 (describing differentiation in the approach to exactions among state legislatures, courts, and
local governments).
37. Id. at 746.
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with “proportionality”) related to the anticipated consequences of the
regulatory approval.38
The Court has consistently repeated that Nollan and Dolan, in which
the inquiries into regulatory reasons and reasonableness smack of
constitutional due process, have never been extended “beyond the special
context of . . . exactions.”39 In Lingle, a unanimous Court emphasized this
caveat about its exactions decisions, expelling from regulatory takings
doctrine the suggestion made in Agins v. City of Tiburon that courts may
consider whether a regulation will “substantially advance legitimate state
interests” as part of a Penn Central balancing test.40 Regulatory “nexus”
and “proportionality” at minimum echo a substantive due process-type
reasonableness inquiry.
Therefore, broad application of Nollan and Dolan to regulatory takings
claims threatens to confuse regulatory takings and due process. Only by
requiring an actual taking as a factual predicate to the challenged exaction
could the Court cabin Nollan and Dolan to preserve its effort in Lingle to
clarify regulatory takings jurisprudence.41 If a Takings Clause challenge to a
regulatory decision falls outside of the special context of exactions by
lacking that factual predicate, a court must apply either strict scrutiny or the
Penn Central balancing test.42
III. EXISTING CASE LAW ON FAILED EXACTIONS
Do these exactions tests apply to failed exactions, and if so, how? A
small number of courts have reviewed challenges to failed exactions
brought under the Takings Clause. This Part considers four such examples,
then concludes with a brief discussion of the range of responses to the issue
and the difficulties that courts have encountered when applying Nollan and
Dolan to failed exactions in an attempt to fashion a remedy for prevailing
plaintiffs.

38. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546–47 (explaining Nollan’s “essential nexus” requirement and Dolan’s
“rough proportionality” requirement).
39. Id. at 547 (quoting City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,
702 (1999)).
40. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). See generally Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540–43.
41. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546–47.
42. Id. at 538.
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A. Koontz v. St. Johns Water Management District
In Koontz, a property owner sought to develop part of a parcel located
along a state road with commercial and residential property in its vicinity.
To do so, Koontz needed to dredge and fill wetlands. However, because his
property was located within a designated riparian habitat protection zone,
he needed a permit from the St. Johns Water Management District.43 Staff
members from the District offered alternative mitigation measures, while
Koontz offered a third, less costly one. Ultimately, the parties could not
agree upon any particular mitigation scheme.44 Numerous trial and appellate
court decisions ensued. A first intermediate appellate decision overruled a
trial court determination that Koontz’s claim was not ripe, because he had
not received a final determination about the condition that would attach to
an approved permit.45 On remand, the trial court applied Nollan and Dolan
and found the District liable. This decision was affirmed by two
intermediate appellate decisions: the first, in 2003, affirmed the trial court’s
order overturning the permit denial on the grounds that it was an
unreasonable exercise of the police power under Nollan, Dolan, and
Agins;46 and the second, in 2009, affirmed the trial court’s decision to award
Respondent compensation for a temporary taking of his land for the period
in which the permit was denied.47
The 2009 district court of appeal decision (Koontz III), which the
Florida Supreme Court reversed two years later, illustrates how courts
struggle to classify failed exactions. There, a three-judge panel issued three
separate opinions. The majority and concurrence rested their decisions to
affirm the trial court’s application of Nollan and Dolan on their reading of
precedent and on what they viewed as the District’s unfair and extortionate
treatment of the property owner. Both the majority and concurrence agreed,
incorrectly,48 that Dolan had extended the exactions decisions to instances
in which no condition was attached to a permit approval.49 Furthermore,
both cited several additional decisions from other jurisdictions that they
43. Koontz IV, No. SC09-713, slip op. at 5 (Fla. Nov. 3, 2011).
44. Id. at 5–6 (quoting St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (Koontz II), 861 So. 2d
1267, 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Pleus, J., concurring specially)).
45. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. (Koontz I), 720 So. 2d 560, 561–62 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998).
46. Koontz II, 861 So. 2d at 1268.
47. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (Koontz III), 5 So. 3d 8, 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2009).
48. See infra Part IV.A.
49. Koontz III, 5 So. 3d at 11; id. at 14 (Orfinger, J., concurring).
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claimed had applied Nollan and Dolan to failed exactions.50 Although
Judge Torpy’s decision mentions the bargaining power that the District
leveraged to force the property owner to agree to an unconstitutional
condition,51 Judge Orfinger’s concurrence more strongly presents the
protection-against-extortionate-demands rationale for applying Nollan and
Dolan in cases like Koontz III.52 He wrote:
As the instant case demonstrates, when the government has the
absolute discretion to grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it still
50. See id. at 11–12 (citing Goss v. City of Little Rock (Goss I), 90 F.3d 306 (8th Cir. 1996);
Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship,
135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004); Salt Lake County v. Bd. of Educ., 808 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1991)). Only one
of the cited cases concerns a failed exaction. In Flower Mound, a property owner sought approval to
construct a residential subdivision. 135 S.W.3d at 622. The Town approved the development permit with
an attached condition that required the property owner to rebuild an abutting road. Id. After exhausting
all available administrative remedies, the property owner acquiesced to the condition and rebuilt the
road. Id. at 624. The Town refused to reimburse any portion of the road renovation cost. Id. The
property owner sued, alleging that the condition placed on the Town’s regulatory approval amounted to
a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the state and federal constitutions. Id. In
Parks, property owners applied for a zoning change and the vacation of certain platted City streets
across their property in order to increase land development. 716 F.2d at 649. The City required that a
twenty-foot strip of property, containing ownership interests to two geothermal wells, be dedicated as a
condition of the permit approval. Id. at 649–50. When property owners refused, the City voted to deny
the vacation petition. Id. at 650. The Ninth Circuit held that the condition violated the Fifth Amendment
since it required the dedication of the geothermal wells, which had “no rational relationship to any
public purpose related to the vacation of the platted streets.” Id. at 653. However, Parks was decided
before Nollan and Dolan and therefore could not have answered the question of whether those later
decisions apply to a permit approval. In addition, Parks used terms and levels of scrutiny that the Court
explicitly rejected in its later decisions and confused Due Process and Takings Clause analysis. Id. at
652 (requiring the condition to be “rationally related to the benefit conferred”); id. at 651 (requiring the
plaintiff to show that “the City’s condition . . . amount[s] to a taking of property without due process of
law”). In Lingle, the Supreme Court forcefully rejected the approach taken in Parks that mixed the two
constitutional doctrines indiscriminately. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005)
(declaring that a due process analysis “has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence”). The Florida
Supreme Court had similarly and earlier warned against mixing the doctrines. See Tampa-Hillsborough
Cnty. Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So. 2d 54, 57 (Fla. 1994) (“[T]he analysis under due
process is different from the analysis under just compensation.”). Perhaps most egregiously, Salt Lake
County, 808 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1991), was decided solely on state law grounds and did not mention either
Nollan or the Fifth Amendment. The issue addressed in Salt Lake County concerned the existence of a
Utah state statute that exempted school districts from paying “local assessments for any purpose.” 808
P.2d at 1057. The County sought a declaratory judgment stating that the school district was not exempt
from paying the drainage fee imposed by the county flood control ordinance. Id. at 1058. The school
district claimed exemption under the statute alleging that the drainage fee was a type of “local
assessment.” Id. The Supreme Court of Utah, without any mention of Nollan or the Fifth Amendment,
held that the drainage fee was an impact fee and as such fell outside of the local assessment category.
See id. at 1061. Goss in fact was a failed exactions decision and represents an exception that illustrates
why it should be the rule that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to such regulatory acts. See infra Part III.B.
51. Koontz III, 5 So. 3d at 12 n.4 (characterizing the plaintiff as “an aggrieved property owner
[forced] to accede to unconstitutional conditions to preserve his right to challenge the abusive practice”).
52. Id. at 14–15 (Orfinger, J., concurring).
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may incur significant liability if, at the conclusion of the land
use/development decision, it is found to have improperly
pressured or coerced the landowner to give up or waive a
constitutional right. And even more troubling, the potential for
governmental liability may be just as likely if the government
simply reaches a bit too far in the bargaining process. . . . The
consequence of the government asking for a bit too much (but far
short of extortion) is governmental liability for damages premised
on the exactions theory.53

The Koontz III majority was appalled by what they viewed as the District’s
unreasonable pressure and coercion and held the District liable for a taking.
The court awarded the plaintiff remedies that only awkwardly relate to the
Fifth Amendment’s textual remedy of compensation for the taken property:
It invalidated the District’s rejection of the property owner’s permit
application and ordered compensation based on the temporary taking of the
property owner’s land for the period in which the permit was denied.54
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the district court of appeal
unanimously in two separate, quite different opinions (Koontz IV). The
four-justice majority focused not on the reasonableness of the District’s
actions, but on the limited reach of Nollan and Dolan to exactions.55 The
Koontz IV majority held that Nollan and Dolan apply only to exactions
conditioning permit approval upon a dedication of a landowner’s interest in
real property when the regulatory agency actually issued the permit
containing such an exaction.56 The majority asserted that this limited
reading has two advantages over an approach that would have held the
District liable. First, land use regulation would become “prohibitively
expensive” if a property owner were allowed to file suit any time
unsuccessful negotiations with the regulatory agency led to a permit
denial.57 Second, regulatory agencies would respond to the risk of large
takings judgments by denying permits outright in order to shield themselves
53. Id. at 14.
54. Id. at 10–11 (majority opinion); Koontz II, 861 So. 2d 1267, 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
55. Koontz IV, No. SC09-713, slip op. at 18 (Fla. Nov. 3, 2011). (“[W]e are guided only by
decisions in which the Supreme Court has expressly applied, or commented upon the scope of, exactions
takings.”).
56. Id. at 19. The court therefore overruled the lower court on the grounds both that Nollan and
Dolan do not apply to failed exactions and only apply to conditions requiring the dedication of land. The
latter grounds, the court does not explain in any detail. See id. at 9 (citing Iowa Assurance Corp. v. City
of Indianola, 650 F.3d 1094, 1096–97 (8th Cir. 2011); W. Linn Corporate Park, LLC v. City of W. Linn,
428 F. App’x 700, 702 (9th Cir. 2011)) (justifying its decision based on recent decisions in two federal
circuits).
57. Id. at 20.
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from the hazard of liability that could result from negotiating and discussing
potential alternatives with landowners seeking permit approval.58
The two-justice concurrence did not reach the regulatory takings
issues.59 Instead, it asserted that the property owner was required to exhaust
all administrative remedies referenced in the applicable Florida statute
before initiating the present regulatory takings action.60 Refusing to reach
the constitutional issues that the majority decided, the concurrence believed
that the claim was unripe and thus not justiciable. Consequently, all of the
justices agreed that the property owner could not seek his preferred remedy
for failed negotiations from a court.
B. Goss v. City of Little Rock
The Eighth Circuit in Goss v. City of Little Rock struggled to apply
Nollan and Dolan to failed exactions.61 In Goss, a property owner
challenged the City of Little Rock’s denial of a rezoning application as a
regulatory taking after the owner refused to dedicate 22% of his 3.7 acre
parcel of land for a highway extension, which the City had sought as a
condition for approval.62 Apparently viewing the petition as a challenge to
the City’s denial of a zoning application, the district court had initially
dismissed the suit.63 In the first appeal, the Eighth Circuit, with little
explanation or reasoning, construed the complaint as stating a claim under
Nollan and Dolan and remanded the case to the trial court for further
consideration.64 Reviewing the permit denial as a failed exaction to which
the Supreme Court’s exactions decisions applied, the district court held on
remand that the dedication requirement effected a taking and ordered the
City to rezone the property owner’s land as commercial without attaching
any such condition.65 It found, however, that the property owner was not
entitled to receive compensatory damages, punitive damages, or attorney’s
fees.66
Considering the case on appeal for a second time, the Eighth Circuit
refused to reconsider the City’s claim that the trial court should not have
58. Id.
59. The exact lineup in Koontz IV was four votes in the majority, two with the concurrence,
and one concurrence by a justice who did not join either opinion.
60. Koontz IV, No. SC09-713, slip op. at 22 (Polston, J., concurring) (citing FLA. STAT.
§ 373.617(2) (2002) (requiring initial administrative review of final agency action)).
61. See Goss v. City of Little Rock (Goss II), 151 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 1998).
62. Id. at 862.
63. Goss I, 90 F.3d 306, 307 (8th Cir. 1996).
64. Id. at 308–10.
65. Goss II, 151 F.3d at 862.
66. Id.
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applied Nollan and Dolan—after all, the earlier appellate panel had ordered
the trial court to apply the tests from those cases.67 Instead, the panel in
Goss II quickly affirmed the district court’s determination that a taking had
occurred, holding that the condition was not roughly proportionate to the
impact of the proposed zoning change.68
But faced with the problem of fashioning a remedy for the taking, the
court reversed course. It overruled the district court’s order to rezone the
property without the attached condition, concluding that the City had “a
legitimate interest” in denying the rezoning application “outright.”69
Therefore, the court held that the property owner was not entitled to
compensation. “Little Rock was not legally required to rezone Goss’s
property,” the court reasoned, and therefore could not be forced to pay the
property owner compensation when the City was merely exercising its
legitimate authority.70 Despite disallowing a remedy, the court nevertheless
awarded the property owner attorney’s fees.71
Goss II thus confronted the issue that the lower appellate court in
Koontz simply ignored when it applied Nollan and Dolan to a failed
exaction: how to award the Takings Clause’s remedy in a failed exaction
case. Although it ultimately concluded that the City’s condition constituted
a taking, the court was forced to concede that no remedy was available
under the Fifth Amendment because no dedication actually occurred. The
property owner suffered no damages that were cognizable under the Fifth
Amendment. Thus, while a failed exaction apparently infringed upon a
right, the Fifth Amendment provided no remedy. The owner could gain
little more than “a purely Pyrrhic victory.”72
C. William J. Jones Insurance Trust v. City of Fort Smith
Like in Goss, the U.S. district court in Jones Insurance Trust found that
a failed exaction effected a taking.73 The facts were quite simple: The
property owner applied to the City of Fort Smith for permission to build a
convenience store on the premises of a gasoline station that it already
operated. City officials required the property owner to grant the City an
expanded right-of-way along the relevant property to widen the adjoining
67. Id. at 863 (holding that “the [City’s] argument that Dolan does not apply is foreclosed by
our contrary decision in the previous appeal”).
68. See id.
69. Id. at 864 (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835–36 (1987)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. William J. Jones Ins. Trust v. City of Fort Smith, 731 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ark. 1990).
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street. In response, the property owner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
enjoin the City from withholding permission until the property owner
granted the condition.74
Displaying broad sympathy for the property owner—in no small part
by including a wholly gratuitous footnote pointing readers to Richard
Epstein’s “brilliantly sustained and intellectually unrelenting elaboration of
the relationship between the Fifth Amendment and taxes” in his book
Takings75—Judge Morris Arnold found that the condition, standing alone,
constituted a taking.76 Unlike the Eighth Circuit in Goss II, however, Judge
Arnold incautiously offered the owner its requested remedy: an injunction
“ordering the City to issue the requested permit unconditionally.”77
D. Lambert v. City & County of San Francisco
In Lambert v. City & County of San Francisco, proprietors of a San
Francisco hotel containing both residential and tourist units sought to
convert the remaining residential units into tourist accommodations. The
property owners applied to the San Francisco Planning Commission for a
conditional use permit.78 Pursuant to local ordinance, such a permit was
prohibited unless the property owner provided one-to-one replacement of
the units or agreed to pay a portion of the replacement costs.79 The City and
property owners disagreed over the replacement costs for the unit
conversion, and the fee the City required was beyond what the property
owner was willing to pay.80 When the property owners offered a figure
significantly below the appraised cost, the City denied the permit.81
A two-judge majority of a California intermediate appellate court
rejected the property owners’ argument that their claim warranted review
under the intermediate scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan. The majority reasoned
that because the Planning Commission rejected the owners’ conversion
application under authority granted by San Francisco’s Planning Code
rather than by attaching a monetary condition which the owners later
rejected, the proper review was of the rejection itself, not the rejected

74. Id. at 913.
75. Id. at 914 n.2.
76. Id. at 914.
77. Id.
78. Lambert v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 564 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 569; see also id. at 569–71 (Strankman, J., dissenting) (discussing negotiations and
disagreements over a mitigation fee in detail).
81. Id. at 569.
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condition.82 One member of the three-judge panel dissented, arguing that
the Planning Commission sought to leverage its regulatory bargaining
power with an extortionate demand for a monetary exaction.83 The dissent
stated that the Planning Commission should not be able to evade judicial
scrutiny by hiding behind its authority to deny the owner a permit if she
refuses to agree.84 In his dissent from the denial of the property owners’
petition for certiorari, Justice Scalia agreed with the Lambert dissent,
dismissing the notion that a condition subsequent—a completed exaction
attached to an approval—should be subject to a wholly different, stricter
level of scrutiny than a condition precedent, to which a property owner
must agree or else face denial.85 Justice Scalia suggested an alternative
approach:
When there is uncontested evidence of a demand for money or
other property—and still assuming that denial of a permit
because of failure to meet such a demand constitutes a taking—it
should be up to the permitting authority to establish either (1)
that the demand met the requirements of Nollan and Dolan, or (2)
that denial would have ensued even if the demand had been
met.86

As Justice Scalia conceded, however, whether or precisely how the
exactions decisions applied in Lambert—or, by extension, other similar
cases—was “far from clear.”87 Moreover, he noted, it was unclear how and
whether compensation could be due when “there is neither a taking nor a
threatened taking.”88
E. Conclusion
As demonstrated above, the case law on failed exactions is somewhat
confused and scattered. Courts are occasionally willing to apply
intermediate scrutiny to instances in which the government acted in an
extortionate manner akin to that in Nollan and Dolan, but they face
significant conceptual and remedial obstacles when they do. However,
some courts blithely ignore such obstacles, as Judge Arnold did in Jones
82. Id. at 569 (majority opinion).
83. Id. at 572 (Strankman, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 572–73.
85. Lambert v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 1045, 1048 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
86. Id. at 1047–48.
87. Id. at 1048.
88. Id.
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Insurance Trust. When no property is taken, how does the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause, which speaks of “private property . . . taken
for public use,”89 apply? If Nollan and Dolan do apply, what is the
condition subject to their nexus and proportionality tests? And if the
property owner wins, how does the Fifth Amendment, which explicitly
provides only one remedy, “just compensation,”90 provide a suitable
remedy for a condition that was never exacted and for a rejected
development application that the government was authorized to reject? Part
IV considers these questions broadly in light of the text of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that text, and broader questions of
administrative procedure and land use regulatory practices.
IV. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE TO FAILED EXACTIONS
A. Nollan and Dolan Concerned Finalized Exactions
What are the regulatory effects that fall within the constitutionally
meaningful category of “exactions”? At a minimum, and perhaps at a
maximum,91 a catalog of the category’s universe of regulatory acts must
begin with Nollan and Dolan. As the Court characterized them in Lingle,
Nollan and Dolan concerned “Fifth Amendment takings challenges to
adjudicative land-use exactions—specifically, government demands that a
landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to her property as a
condition of obtaining a development permit.”92 In Dolan, the property
owner challenged requirements that she grant public easements for a
floodplain and bike path as conditions attached to her approved permit
application by the City of Tigard’s Planning Commission.93 In Nollan, the
89. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
90. Id.
91. See Koontz IV, No. SC09-713, slip op. at 18 (Fla. Nov. 3, 2011). (“[W]e are guided only by
decisions in which the Supreme Court has expressly applied, or commented upon the scope of, exactions
takings.”).
92. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005).
93. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379–80 (1994). The majority and concurrence in
Koontz III asserted that Dolan was in fact a failed exactions case—indeed, both appear to indicate that
their decisions turn on this point. See Koontz III, 5 So. 3d 8, 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (declaring that
the question of Nollan and Dolan’s applicability to failed exactions “has already been answered in
Dolan itself”); id. at 13–14 (Orfinger, J., concurring) (asserting that had Dolan not decided this issue, he
would have agreed with the dissent that the property owner had lost nothing and could not state a takings
claim). They base their claim on Justice Stevens’s statement in his Dolan dissent that “no taking has yet
occurred,” as the owner had not yet begun the expanded use of her property and therefore had not yet
been required to deed an easement to the government. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). But the Dolan majority’s recitation of the facts clearly states that the government had
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property owners challenged a condition attached to a building permit issued
by the California Coastal Commission requiring them to grant an easement
allowing the public to walk across their property.94 In both cases, the
property owners challenged the exactions attached to their applications to
build. These conditions required the dedication of public easements and
therefore forced the property owners to forfeit their right to exclude the
public from their land and suffer a permanent occupation of their property.
These conditions clearly would have required compensation under the
Loretto test if imposed unilaterally and outside of the narrow context of
exactions.95
If Nollan and Dolan present the archetypal sets of facts that trigger
intermediate scrutiny, then we can draw two inferences about the type of
conditions that constitute “exactions” in a federal constitutional sense. First,
the condition must include a “taking” of property for which compensation
would be due if the government imposed the requirement unilaterally—this
must be true no matter how limited or broad the universe of conditions to
which the two decisions apply. Second, Nollan and Dolan can only apply
when the government agency officially requires the challenged condition in
a completed regulatory process. The property owners in both cases knew
precisely what was required of them by the final conditions attached to the
approvals they received at the end of the application process. These
triggering facts work together to form the basis for administrative and
judicial review, allowing both processes to identify the taken property
interests to which the nexus and rough proportionality tests apply.
Failed exactions, in which agencies have issued no conditional
approval, differ from Nollan and Dolan. This distinction is both formal and
procedural. On first glance, the formal distinction appears insignificant. In
Justice Scalia’s terms, there is little functional difference between a
condition precedent and a condition subsequent—in each, the government
is conditioning issuance of an entitlement on an otherwise unconstitutional
condition.96 But the difference between the failed exaction (in which the
“granted petitioner’s permit application subject to conditions imposed by the city’s [Community
Development Code].” Id. at 379; see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 439 (Or. 1993) (stating
that the government “granted petitioner’s application, but required as conditions [the dedication of
various easements]”).
94. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987).
95. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385–86 (characterizing exactions as “a requirement that [the owner]
deed portions of the property to the city,” for which she would otherwise be due just compensation);
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 (“Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their
beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the
beach, . . . we have no doubt there would have been a taking.”).
96. Lambert v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 1045, 1048 (2000).
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government never finalizes the condition as required for an entitlement that
it can deny) and the completed one (in which the government has identified
and specified the conditions it will require) is crucial for constitutional
purposes. Only when the agency has specified the exaction can a court
know what property has or will be taken. Insofar as the Fifth Amendment’s
text requires property to be taken as a basis for just compensation (a point I
will develop further below), Nollan and Dolan require the identification and
finalization of a condition as a predicate to an exactions claim.
This seemingly insignificant but constitutionally meaningful formal
requirement, which the Koontz majority recognized in refusing to expand
Nollan and Dolan,97 also has a procedural purpose. A property owner surely
could not use failed negotiations or discussions over an exaction as a means
to avoid the ripeness and administrative exhaustion requirements necessary
for a takings claim.98 This procedural point, which is related to the formal,
substantive one, persuaded the concurrence in Koontz that it could not reach
the property owner’s constitutional challenge to a failed exaction.99
Exhaustion and ripeness requirements help preserve judicial resources and
give agencies the opportunity to build a record that can demonstrate
compliance with Nollan and Dolan. An agency might defer its nexus and
proportionality study until it has finalized its proposed mitigation.
Following Nollan and Dolan, agencies know to prepare such findings when
they officially issue a conditional permit. Forcing them to meet such
requirements before permit issuance will either raise administrative costs or
make negotiations and discussions over mitigation appear less attractive to
agencies. These consequences are considered in more detail below. For
now, note that the procedural distinction between failed and completed
exactions is in fact quite significant. Moreover, this distinction illustrates
why the Court would and should limit Nollan and Dolan’s intermediate
scrutiny to final conditions, even if the dedications have not yet occurred.
B. Finalized Exactions and the Fifth Amendment Text
The Fifth Amendment states that “private property [shall not] be taken
for public use, without just compensation.”100 Failed exactions do not
culminate in “private property” being “taken for public use.” Unlike in
Nollan and Dolan, the state has not identified property to be taken in
97. Koontz IV, No. SC09-713, slip op. at 19 (Fla., Nov. 3, 2011).
98. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985);
see also infra Part IV.D.
99. Koontz IV, No. SC09-713, slip op. at 22 (Polston, J., concurring).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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exchange for a permit approval. Instead, the property owners’ application
has been denied. Even when an agency’s actions are unreasonable and
result in extortionate demands or bad faith, no property has been taken. As a
constitutional matter, the claim sounds in due process, not in the Takings
Clause.
Because no property was taken, no “just compensation” can be
awarded. It is well-established that the Takings Clause “is designed not to
limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to
secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference
amounting to a taking.”101 When a court considers whether the government
has taken property, it must identify the property interest actually taken from
the owner that the government will receive in exchange for its payment of
just compensation. In an exactions case, if a court determines that the
Nollan and Dolan tests have not been met, the exacted property is deemed
taken and the government must pay compensation for the property interest
exacted.102 However, when the government first considers approving a
conditional permit with an exaction but decides instead to deny the permit
application without imposing a condition, there is no identifiable property
interest for which the government could logically be required to pay
compensation.
The logic and purpose behind the Nollan and Dolan tests command this
conclusion. Nollan and Dolan rest on the premise that the government
always has the option to restrict the use of property in order to protect the
health and safety of the public rather than attempt to mitigate the effects of
proposed development through an exaction. When the government chooses
to deny a permit, courts apply the traditional, deferential regulatory takings
doctrine; when the government chooses to approve with conditions, courts
apply intermediate scrutiny. Thus, the heightened, but not per se or strict,
takings standard of Nollan and Dolan reflects not only the fact that an
exaction is more intrusive than mere regulation of property use, but also
that the government could have rejected the development application rather
than approving it with exactions. Nollan and Dolan presume that the
government always has the option under its police power authority to reject
the development application rather than approving it with an exaction
attached. It logically follows that when the government has in fact decided

101. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 315 (1987).
102. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841–43 (1987) (holding that if
government “wants an easement,” and the forced dedication is deemed to be unconstitutional,
government “must pay for it”).
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to act in a traditional regulatory mode in lieu of imposing an exaction,
traditional regulatory takings analysis must apply.
Indeed, the logic of the Court’s entire categorical approach to the
Takings Clause requires that the government has in fact taken property for
Nollan and Dolan to apply. Lingle explained that a regulatory taking must
be “functionally equivalent” to confiscation.103 In Lucas, the Court held that
the “total” taking of the use and value of the property was “the equivalent
of a physical appropriation.”104 Similarly, a permanent physical invasion
“eviscerates the owner’s right to exclude others . . . [which is] perhaps the
most fundamental of all property interests.”105 And in Nollan and Dolan, the
appropriation of an easement as part of the issuance of a development
permit “would have been a per se physical taking” if the government had
simply confiscated it.106 Lingle made clear that the fundamental predicate
required for the Takings Clause to apply is a government act that
confiscates or approximates the confiscation of privately owned land.
Offers, negotiations, or even threats to take land do not create a
constitutionally mandated compensation requirement. As Judge Griffin
stated in her dissent in Koontz III, “[i]t is not the making of an offer to
which unconditional conditions are attached in violation of the limitations
of Nollan/Dolan that gives rise to a taking; it is the receipt of some tangible
benefit under such coercive circumstances that gives rise to the taking.”107
In addition to specifying that the taking of property is a constitutionally
permitted wrong, the Fifth Amendment also specifically identifies “just
compensation” as the only remedy available to the property owner. This
limitation is obvious in the eminent domain context when the state
condemns or confiscates property, forcing the owner to transfer ownership
of the property. The transfer of that property then becomes the basis for
compensation. Under Lingle’s “functional equivalence” logic, the Fifth
Amendment’s remedy must be identical for a regulatory taking.
Furthermore, Lingle’s rejection of due process logic within regulatory
takings tests also requires courts to refuse to award the archetypal due
process remedies of an invalidation of the challenged state action and an
103. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
104. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992).
105. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
106. Id. at 546.
107. Koontz III, 5 So. 3d 8, 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (citing Lingle,
544 U.S. at 539–40); see also Koontz IV, No. SC09-713, slip op. at 8 (Fla. Nov. 3, 2011) (“[I]n what
parallel legal universe or deep chamber of Wonderland’s rabbit hole could there be a right to just
compensation for the taking of property under the Fifth Amendment when no property of any kind was
ever taken by the government and none ever given up by the owner?” (quoting Koontz III, 5 So. 3d at 20
(Griffin, J., dissenting))).
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injunction against future similar action.108 Put simply, compensation is the
only remedy available for a prevailing plaintiff in a regulatory takings
action.
Existing cases demonstrate that failed exactions require a remedy other
than compensation. The Eighth Circuit recognized this in Goss II and
awarded neither compensation nor invalidation. The court in Jones
Insurance Trust and the intermediate appellate court in Koontz III provided
inappropriate remedies. Each invalidated a valid exercise of regulatory
authority, while the overturned decision in Koontz III also compensated the
owner for the temporary taking of his property during the period when his
permit application had been denied. This occurred even though the decision
to reject the application was authorized by state law, and the court did not
evaluate whether during that period the owner had lost all economically
beneficial use of the property. Neither court could apply the appropriate,
and only, remedy available under the Just Compensation Clause to a
prevailing plaintiff in a regulatory takings case—clear evidence of the
inappropriate nature of such a claim under the Fifth Amendment.
C. Failed Exactions and the Negotiation Process
The land use process has come to depend increasingly on regulatory
tools that allow for flexibility and bargaining between government entities
and property owners.109 Local land use regulation has accordingly stood in
the vanguard of regulatory flexibility and negotiation, a trend that has
gained some purchase at the federal level.110 Flexibility in the local land use
process can serve as a means to resolve disputes along two axes: first, by
enabling regulator and regulated to find mutually agreeable terms; and
108. But see Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2607 (2010) (plurality opinion) (stating, in dictum, that there is “no reason why [compensation] would
be the exclusive remedy for a judicial taking”). In a few outlying modern regulatory takings decisions,
issued before Lingle’s clear statement that compensation is the only remedy available under the Just
Compensation Clause, the Court has granted non-compensatory relief to prevailing plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 521 (1998) (plurality opinion) (affirming injunctive relief granted by
the U.S. district court for a regulatory takings claim in a monetary takings case, as opposed to the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims acting under Tucker Act jurisdiction, for suggesting that requiring
compensation for a taking of money would be “an utterly pointless set of activities” (quoting Student
Loan Mktg. Ass’n v. Riley, 104 F.3d 397, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1997))); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716–18
(1987) (invalidating a federal statute on the ground that it effected a taking of private property without
just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment).
109. See generally STEWART E. STERK & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, LAND USE REGULATION
31–51 (2011).
110. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570 (1994 & Supp. 2000). See
generally JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM
653–57 (2009) (summarizing literature on negotiated rulemaking in federal administrative processes).
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second, by enabling a more responsive local regulatory process that not
only can lead to more participatory and popular results but also can alleviate
local voter antipathy towards new development and anxiety about its effects
on home values.111 The threat that failed negotiations can serve as the basis
for a Nollan and Dolan challenge to an agency’s preliminary and informal
offers will have significant effects on the bargaining process. As Judge
Griffin noted in her dissent in Koontz III, applying Nollan and Dolan to
failed exactions will make negotiations “too risky for a governmental
agency to make offers for conditional permit approvals or to offer a trade of
benefits out of fear that the offer might be rejected and the condition later
found to have lacked adequate nexus or proportionality.”112
In this regard, property owners might ultimately be harmed. Wary
government agencies might simply deny permits and face lower scrutiny
under the Penn Central test rather than discuss mitigation measures as
conditions for approval and face heightened scrutiny under Nollan and
Dolan.113 By inhibiting a government agency’s willingness to bargain
without inhibiting its authority to deny a property owner’s application to
develop, applying Nollan and Dolan to failed exactions would eliminate a
valuable right from property owners—or at least an important opportunity
to reach a preferred end 114––while simultaneously removing a key
regulatory tool and process for government agencies. This represents the
worst possible result: government agencies cannot negotiate adequate,
workable mitigation measures with property owners; property owners are
more likely to be denied discretionary approvals from wary government
agencies; and the entire regulatory process becomes more rigid and
mechanical, resulting in a larger proportion of denials and fewer negotiated
solutions to pressing environmental and planning conflicts.115
D. Failed Exactions and the Administrative Review Process
Property owners can also use any discussions or negotiations as a
springboard for avoiding administrative appeals to permit denials. They
111. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER H YPOTHESIS 230–32 (2001); Fenster, Takings
Formalism, supra note 10, at 668–78.
112. Koontz III, 5 So. 3d at 21 (Griffin, J., dissenting).
113. Cf. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 348–
49 (1995) (characterizing Nollan and Dolan as decisions which appear to offer property owners formal
protections while harming their ability to bargain to their preferred result).
114. Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA
L. REV. 1, 50 (2000).
115. Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 10, at 652–67 (noting the variable but generally
worse consequences of imposing formal rules on negotiation processes).
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thereby bypass the long-settled means for local governments to review and
reconsider decisions and to build a thorough administrative record for
judicial review. These procedural hurdles stand especially tall in delaying
litigants’ entrance to federal court under the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision
in Williamson County, which requires a claimant to “seek compensation
through the procedures the State has provided for doing so” in order to
ripen a federal constitutional takings claim.116 Under Williamson County,
claimants must raise all of their state claims in state court before their
federal takings claims are ripe for adjudication in federal court.117 As the
Court explained a year after Williamson County, “an essential prerequisite”
to a regulatory takings claim “is a final and authoritative determination of
the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject
property.”118 Williamson County made clear that without such a
determination, “it is impossible to tell whether the land retained any
reasonable beneficial use or whether respondent’s expectation interests had
been destroyed.”119
States tend to follow this general logic in establishing their own
ripeness doctrines.120 This applies equally in takings challenges to
exactions, where the Oregon Supreme Court has recently explained:
[A] requirement that a property owner take administrative steps
prior to bringing judicial action permits the local government to
determine the necessary effects of the regulations and whether,
knowing those effects, it wishes to impose or enforce them. Just
as a court benefits by requiring that local governments have the
opportunity to assess fully the effects that use limitations have on
property owners, so too does a court benefit from requiring that
116. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985).
117. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 337 (2005) (assuming
Williamson County requires a “final state judgment” before a federal takings claim becomes ripe in
federal court); id. at 348–49 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (agreeing that Willamson County requires a
claimant to seek compensation in state court before bringing a federal takings claim in federal court but
questioning whether the decision was correct).
118. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986). For a general
discussion of ripeness and regulatory takings in federal courts, see Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory
Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1995).
119. Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 189 n.11.
120. See, e.g., Milagra Ridge Partners, Ltd. v. City of Pacifica, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 394, 399–400
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that California has adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to the
ripeness doctrine); Casey v. Mayor of Rockville, 929 A.2d 74, 103–04 (Md. 2007) (explaining
Maryland’s ripeness doctrine with reference to U.S. Supreme Court precedents and explicitly adopting
Williamson County’s approach to ripeness for regulatory takings claims in state court); Hill-Grant
Living Trust v. Kearsarge Lighting Precinct, 986 A.2d 662, 669 (N.H. 2009); Mayhew v. Town of
Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex. 1998) (explaining the ripeness doctrine in the regulatory takings
context with reference to U.S. Supreme Court precedent).
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local governments have the opportunity to consider fully whether
the conditions on development that it seeks to require are
proportional to the impacts of development and whether to insist
on imposing those conditions, given the assessment that it
makes.121

As the concurrence in Koontz IV noted regarding Florida law, owners must
use the required administrative review procedures to challenge the propriety
of a permit denial, and then file their legal challenge in the district court of
appeal or the trial court sitting in its appellate capacity over administrative
adjudications.122 Government agencies are thereby able to reconsider their
regulatory decisions through an orderly administrative process that will
produce a record that can in turn enable efficient and accurate judicial
review. Allowing property owners to avoid these longstanding, orderly
administrative and judicial procedures to challenge a permit denial can
encourage property owners to seek judicial review of unripe claims with
complex factual disputes that require extensive development at trial.
CONCLUSION
Failed exactions claims are non-cognizable under the Supreme Court’s
Nollan and Dolan tests, and the non-existent conditions that would form the
basis of such claims cannot constitute property under the plain text of the
Takings Clause. In some circumstances, a property owner might have
viable claims under the U.S. Constitution or other authorities to challenge
the government’s regulatory acts. The permit denial that follows from failed
negotiations can serve as the basis of a takings claim under the default Penn
Central test, albeit one with little chance of winning.123 Especially unfair
treatment by the regulatory agency could serve as the basis for a substantive
due process claim under the U.S. Constitution—again, one that might exist
more in theory than in practice.124 But federal law is not the only protection
121. W. Linn Corporate Park, L.L.C. v. City of W. Linn, 240 P.3d 29, 38 (Or. 2010); see also id.
at 39 (holding that “Oregon law requires the landowner to pursue available local administrative
remedies . . . as a prerequisite to bringing that action in state court”).
122. See Koontz IV, No. SC09-713, slip op. at 22 (Fla. Nov. 3, 2011) (Polston, J., concurring)
(citing FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2002)); Key Haven Associated Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 427 So. 2d 153, 159 (Fla. 1982)).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 28–29 (describing Penn Central and its role in
regulatory takings jurisprudence); see also Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory
Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 525, 544–76 (2009) (describing how Penn Central’s balancing test
works after Lingle).
124. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2614–15 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005)
(“[T]he Due Process Clause is intended, in part, to protect the individual against ‘the exercise of power
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to which property owners can turn. State courts can provide some relief to
the extent that state constitutional law provides greater due process and
property rights protection than federal constitutional law.125 More
promisingly, state and local governments can and do impose legal
limitations on the use of exactions.126 Further, political norms and the threat
of political accountability can stop or soften regulatory hard-bargaining,
especially when it unfairly overreaches.127
None of these solutions will provide absolute protection for a property
owner who has been exploited by a state or local entity acting in bad faith.
While it is unclear how frequently such bad-faith dealings occur, it is quite
clear that property owners should have no recourse to the heightened
scrutiny that Nollan and Dolan provide.

without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective.’” (quoting
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998))). But see Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2606
(plurality opinion) (denying the applicability of substantive due process to the regulation of property); J.
Peter Byrne, Due Process Claims After Lingle, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 471, 472 (2007) (characterizing the
likelihood of a property owner’s victory with a federal substantive due process claim as “virtually
never”).
125. With respect to states’ substantive due process doctrines, see Byrne, supra note 124, at
480–91 (describing state courts’ roles in policing unfair land use regulation, and in developing more
locally sensitive standards of review under state substantive due process doctrines). On state courts’
applications of distinct regulatory takings doctrines, see Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L. J. 203, 261–70 (2004). Indeed, Florida itself has long
adopted its own standards for the review of impact fees, although that test would not, after Koontz IV, be
applicable to failed exactions. See Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 609–10 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (developing a due process-based dual-rational-nexus test that considers whether
there was a reasonable connection between (1) the locality’s need for additional capital facilities and the
new development and (2) the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the new development).
126. See Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow, supra note 3, at 758–68.
127. Id.

